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German Tornado Recce aircraft have been engaged in reconnaissance operations over Syria 
since January 2016. In December 2015 the German government and parliament decided that 
up to 1,200 Bundeswehr soldiers would take part in the international coalition fighting Isla-
mic State in Syria. This decision marks a new chapter in Germany’s activity in the Middle East. 
The increasing destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood and the consequences this has 
for the EU and Germany have forced the German government to increase its level of engage-
ment in the region. Even though Germany is a third-rate player in the Middle Eastern game, 
it is nonetheless ever more engaged politically and wants to be viewed as a neutral mediator 
between the competing actors in the region. It has also allocated more funds on regional 
development co-operation and humanitarian aid. Germany, whose attention has been direc-
ted towards Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, is currently turning its attention to the South. 
The Middle East (and Africa) is taking on increasing significance in German foreign and securi-
ty policy. This may affect NATO’s eastern flank and the EU’s eastern neighbourhood since part 
of Germany’s instruments and funds may be redirected to the South. 
The German military engagement… 
In December 2015, the German government and 
parliament decided that their country would 
take part in the US-led international coalition’s 
operation against Islamic State (IS) in Syria, in-
cluding its engagement covering surveillance, 
aerial refuelling, command and escort of the 
French aircraft carrier. Germany’s decision is of 
great political significance, however the Ger-
man military contribution bears little military 
impact. It is much smaller than the French or 
British engagement, however larger than that 
of the Netherlands and Denmark (see Appen-
dix 1). The German contribution includes: a type 
122 Augsburg frigate (for combating subma-
rines) to escort the French Charles de Gaulle 
aircraft carrier off the Syrian coast, six Torna-
do Recce aircraft for surveillance operations 
in Syria, an Airbus 310 MRTT aircraft for aerial 
refuelling and participation of staff officers. 
In aggregate, the German government can send 
up to 1,200 soldiers to take part in the oper-
ation – in fact the Bundeswehr sent between 
500 and 700 soldiers at the beginning of 2016, 
with the option to expand its contingent in the 
future. Following the vote in the Bundestag, the 
US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter appealed 
to EU member states, including Germany, to 
further increase their participation in the opera-
tion1. At the present time there is no discussion 
in Germany regarding whether the Bundeswehr 
should strengthen its engagement. However, 
important voices have been heard stating that 
1 Kampf gegen IS: Deutsche Tornados sind den USA zu 
wenig, Spiegel Online 12 December 2015, http://www.
spiegel.de/politik /ausland/syrien-einsatz-usa-fordern-
mehr-deutsches-engagement-gegen-is-a-1067385.html 
<?> Kampf gegen IS: Deutsche Tornados sind den USA zu wenig’, Spiegel 
Online 12 December 2015, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/
syrien-einsatz-usa-fordern-mehr-deutsches-engagement-gegen-
is-a-1067385.html 
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Germany needs to take part in the UN’s stabili-
sation operation after a possible deal has been 
struck between the Assad regime and the op-
position2. German soldiers have also been pres-
ent in Iraq since January 2014. Up to 100 sol-
diers are stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan, supplying 
weapons and military equipment (including ri-
fles, Milan anti-tank missiles and launchers) and 
training Peshmerga troops. In January 2016, 
the German government decided to increase 
the number of instructors to 150. 
Germany’s decision to take part in the opera-
tion in Syria is of great political significance – it 
is proof of the country’s solidarity with its most 
important partner in Europe – France – and 
of the West’s unity. Since Germany (and the 
United Kingdom) has joined the US-led inter-
national coalition engaged in the operation in 
Syria, this provides a kind of legitimacy for the 
West’s military activity in this region. Until re-
cently Germany did not want to be engaged in 
the international coalition’s operations against 
Islamic State in Syria. It refrained from being 
engaged not only because of its conviction that 
air strikes would contribute little to resolving 
the conflict and a reluctance to participate in 
operations of this kind, but also because of the 
unclear legal grounds for the international co-
alition’s operations in Syria. However, the Paris 
terrorist attacks have radically changed the in-
ternational situation. After France’s appeal for 
military assistance in combating IS – addressed 
above all to the United Kingdom and Germa-
ny – the German government could not use 
2 Volker Perthes, Eine Lösung für Syrien, Handelsblatt, 
21 September 2015, http://www.swp-berlin.org/de/
publikationen/produkt-detail/article/eine_loesung_
fuer_syrien.html
the excuse that it is stepping up its militarily 
engagement in Africa. Since the ostracism Ger-
many faced following its refusal to participate 
in the intervention in Libya in 2011, the German 
government has stuck to the principle that it 
will take part, at least symbolically, in opera-
tions initiated by its largest European allies. The 
German public are divided concerning this deci-
sion – 49% of respondents support it, and 46% 
believe it is wrong3. 
The government’s decision concerning the 
Bundeswehr’s participation in military activ-
ity in Syria has given rise to reservations of 
a legal nature in Germany and can be contested 
at the Federal Constitutional Court as unconsti-
tutional. At present, the German government 
provides the following legal grounds for its 
participation in the international coalition in 
Syria: (1) article 51 of the UN Charter which per-
mits military support to be offered to France 
and Iraq as part of their right to individual and 
collective self-defence; (2) resolution 2249 of 
the UN Security Council of 20 November 2015 
which appeals to the UN member states to 
combat Islamic State; and (3) obligations with 
regard to France under the ‘mutual assistance 
and support clause’ (article 42.7 of the Treaty 
on European Union – TEU). Such legal grounds 
are criticised, and not only in Germany. Islamic 
State is not a de jure state entity. Furthermore, 
actions taken by France and other countries 
in Syria in response to the terrorist attacks of 
13 November 2015 are often evaluated as ex-
ceeding the right to self-defence and the provi-
sions under article 51 of the UN Charter. Mean-
while, resolution 2249, due an objection from 
Russia, fails to provide clear authorisation for 
military intervention. In turn, France’s invoking 
of article 42.7 of the TEU which concerns military 
aggression (instead of article 222 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union con-
cerning terrorist attacks, among other options) 
3 Deutsche über Anti-IS-Einsatz und Flüchtlingspolitik ge-
spalten, 11 December 2015, Reuters Deutschland, http://
de.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idDEKBN0TU-
0XE20151211
Germany’s decision to take part in the 
operation in Syria is of great political 
significance, but its military contribution 
bears little military impact.
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is viewed by some as groundless. Furthermore, 
support to France is provided on bilateral terms 
and not through the EU, and therefore the EU 
cannot be treated as a collective security system 
on the grounds of the aforementioned clause, 
which would have provided legal grounds for 
the Bundeswehr to be used in compliance with 
the German Basic Law4. 
…and political engagement
For Germany – pursuant to the constant para-
digm of the German security policy – military 
engagement in combating IS is of secondary 
importance when compared to finding a polit-
ical solution to the civil war in Syria, one effect 
of which is the expansion of IS. This results from 
the belief that military intervention alone will 
not lead to combating IS and will not resolve 
the Syrian conflict, which involves not only the 
Assad regime and the opposition groupings 
but also regional players (Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Turkey) and global players (the USA and 
Russia). Therefore, Germany has appealed for 
a peaceful resolution to the conflict to be devel-
oped through negotiations, with all the major 
actors being engaged. Germany’s ministers of 
foreign affairs and defence have presented po-
litical strategies for fighting Islamic State and 
resolving the conflict in Syria5. By emphasising 
the weight of political solutions they also aim 
to reduce the German public’s scepticism about 
their country’s participation in the military op-
eration in Syria. 
For the time being, Germany is a third-rate ac-
tor in the Middle East. It has limited possibilities 
4 Syrien-Einsatz der Bundeswehr: Eine Klage vor dem 
Bundesverfassungsgericht hatte gute Chancen, 3  De-
cember 2015, Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/
politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-einsatz-in-syrien-klage-
vor-dem-bvg-haette-gute-chancen-a-1065895.html
5 Ursula von der Leyen, Sechs-Punkte-Plan gegen ISIS, Bild, 
30 November 2015, http://www.bild.de/politik/inland/
verteidigungsministerin/ursula-von-der-leyen-erklaert-
ihren-6-punkte-plan-zur-bekaempfung-des-is-43598488.
bild.html, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‚Ein politisches Kon-
zept gegen ISIS’, Berliner Zeitung, 9 December 2015, 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/
Interviews/2015/151209-BM_FR.html
of having a real impact on the politics of this 
region dominated by Saudi-Iranian and Turk-
ish-Iranian rivalry and where the largest play-
ers, the USA and Russia, are trying to enforce 
their own interests. However, Germany has 
been developing its diplomatic activity. Ger-
many and sixteen other states are the found-
ing members of the International Syria Support 
Group (ISSG), which began development of the 
outline of a peace plan for Syria from October 
2015 during negotiations in Vienna, which was 
approved by the UN Security Council in Decem-
ber 2015 (Appendix 2). The German Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier made 
a number of visits to the region (including to 
Saudi Arabia and Iran,) before the talks in Vien-
na in October 2015 as well as in February 2016 
German representatives are also present in UN 
structures engaged in resolving the conflict 
in Syria. Towards the end of September 2015, 
Volker Perthes, director of the German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs (SWP), be-
came the chairman of one of the four working 
groups (the military, security and counter-ter-
rorism working group) which report to Staffan 
de Mistura, the UN special envoy to Syria. 
Germany has ramped up its humanitarian aid 
and development co-operation for the entire 
region. Since the beginning of the civil war in 
Syria, Germany has been the third largest donor 
of humanitarian aid for refugees in the Mid-
dle East. Germany earmarked US$1.228 billion 
for this purpose between 2012 and 20156. 
6 Financial Tracking Service (FTS), Donor funding 2012 
to 2015, 29 December 2015, https://fts.unocha.org/pa-
geloader.aspx?page=search-reporting_display&CQ=c-
q260115191009dOLEaWyOry
Germany has limited possibilities of hav-
ing a real impact on the politics of this re-
gion, but it has been developing diplomat-
ic activity, development co-operation and 
humanitarian aid.
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Within this timeframe larger sums were offered 
only by the US (US$4.644 billion) and British 
(US$1.547 billion) governments. German hu-
manitarian aid is focused above all on support-
ing the countries which share a border with 
Syria (especially Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Tur-
key) – including the construction of temporary 
infrastructure (camps, water and sewage grids, 
sanitary facilities), medical supplies to the Red 
Crescent and training and equipment offered 
to rescue services. The Federal Agency for Tech-
nical Relief (Technisches Hilfswerk) is one of the 
most important actors engaged in German hu-
manitarian aid in the region. Germany is also 
one of the main donors to the World Food Pro-
gramme (WFP), the UN agency tasked with pro-
viding food assistance in refugee camps across 
the region; it has allocated a total of US$1.2 
billion for this purpose since 2011 (larger con-
tributions were made by the USA, the United 
Kingdom and Canada)7. 
Since the Arab Spring in 2010, the Federal Min-
istry for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (BMZ) has intensified the development of 
its co-operation with four countries in the Mid-
dle East (Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Pales-
tine; co-operation with Syria was suspended in 
2011). Germany has most frequently engaged 
in projects with Jordan (603 million euros in 
2012–2015), Yemen (103 million euros in 2013) 
and Lebanon (275 million euros in 2012–2015). 
The overriding goals of this co-operation in-
clude the political stabilisation of both regions, 
the improvement of economic conditions in 
these countries and limiting the influx of im-
migrants and refugees to Europe and Germa-
ny8. Germany has also promised to increase the 
volume of its co-operation with Turkey from 
7 World Food Programme, Contributions to WFP: Compara-
tive Figures and Five-Year Aggregate Ranking from 2011 to 
2015, 27 December 2015, http://documents.wfp.org/stel-
lent/groups/public/documents/research/wfp232961.pdf
8 Auswärtiges Amt, Naher und Mittlerer Osten. Trans-
formationspartnerschaften, 24 June 2015, http://www.
auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwer-
punkte/NaherMittlererOsten/Transformationspartner-
schaften/150624_TransfPartnerschaften_node.html
37 million euros in 2015 to 52 million euros 
in 2016 (a significant part of the funds will 
be allocated to support the communes locat-
ed adjacent to the Syrian border where refu-
gees have found shelter). The BMZ’s projects 
are supplemented with special programmes of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Transformation-
spartnerschaften). In 2011, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs launched a programme supporting 
democratic transformation in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco, Libya, Jordan and Yemen. During the 
Syria Donors Conference in February 2016 Ger-
many will also present the idea for setting up 
an international programme for creating half 
a million jobs for Syrian refugees in Jordan, Leb-
anon and Turkey9. 
Germany in the Middle East
The ongoing destabilisation of the EU’s south-
ern neighbourhood as well as its direct and indi-
rect consequences for the EU and Germany (ref-
ugees and illegal immigrants, terrorism) have 
forced Germany to strengthen its engagement 
in the Middle East. This will result in the region’s 
significance increasing in German foreign and 
security policy. However, this does not mean 
that Germany has a coherent political strategy 
for unpredictable Middle East affairs. Germa-
ny views itself rather as a neutral mediator in 
the process of developing political solutions 
and maintaining channels of communications 
between competing actors. Germany is one of 
the few Western countries to have maintained 
9 Ishaan Tharoor, Germany has a new plan for Syrian ref-
ugees: Give them jobs, not sanctuary, The Washington 
Post, 27.01.2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/27/germany-has-a-new-
plan-for-syrian-refugees-give-them-jobs-not-sanctuary/ 
Germany views itself as a neutral mediator 
in the development of political solutions.
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good political and economic relations with Iran 
(which supports Bashar al-Assad’s regime), the 
Arab states of the Persian Gulf (which want the 
Assad regime to be overthrown and Iranian 
influence in the region to weaken) and Turkey 
(which wants the Assad regime to be abolished 
without strengthening of Syrian Kurds). 
Iran has been Germany’s traditional partner 
with which it has been building a network of 
political, economic and cultural contacts since 
the early 1950s. For Germany, the end of Iran’s 
international isolation offers a greater chance 
for the conflict in Syria to be resolved owing to 
Teheran’s direct participation in the peace talks. 
This also offers the opportunity for good Ger-
man-Iranian relations to be rebuilt. The German 
deputy chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, was the first 
politician from a large Western state to visit Iran 
(accompanied by a large delegation of represent-
atives of German business circles) after the deal 
on the Iranian nuclear programme was signed. 
It has been estimated that trade volume with 
Iran, once the sanctions are lifted, may increase 
fourfold (from only 2.5 billion euros in 2014)10.
Given its oil reserves and the influence the 
House of Saud has in the Middle East, Saudi 
Arabia in the recent past was treated by the 
West and Germany as a strategic partner, nec-
essary for maintaining stability and equilibrium 
in the region. It has been among the 20 largest 
importers of German arms and military equip-
10 Iranreise des Sigmar Gabriel, Handelsblatt, 19 July 2015, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/iran-
reise-des-sigmar-gabriel-iran-empfaengt-die-deutsche-
wirtschaft/12075998.html
ment. The economic aspect of relations has 
also been gaining significance. In 2014, Saudi 
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Ku-
wait, Oman and Bahrain, taken together, were 
Germany’s third largest non-European export 
market (after the USA and China), worth 26.65 
billion euros11. Due to the Saudi government’s 
controversial moves in domestic and foreign 
policy, Germany no longer refers to Saudi Ara-
bia as its ‘strategic partner’, and the German 
intelligence service BND has warned in media 
leaks of the growing destabilising influence of 
the House of Saud in the Middle East. However, 
Saudi Arabia will remain an important partner 
for Germany (and the West), since the alterna-
tive can only be another failed state12. 
Germany defines Turkey as the key state for 
resolving the conflict in Syria. However, it has 
been very critical about the actions taken by 
the Turkish government against Kurds as part 
of the pre-election struggle there. In August 
2015, Germany decided to withdraw its Patriot 
air defence system battery from NATO’s oper-
ation in Turkey13. Germany’s present approach 
to Turkey is linked above all to the migration 
crisis and putting pressure on Ankara to less-
en the wave of migrants coming from Syria 
and the neighbouring countries to Germany. 
One proof of Berlin’s determination to co-op-
erate with Ankara was the spectacular visit by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel to Turkey in October 
2015 (which was criticised in Germany) in the 
final period of Turkey’s turbulent parliamentary 
campaign. Further proof was provided by the 
first German-Turkish intergovernmental consul-
tations that took place in January 2016.
11 Rafał Bajczuk, Germany is strengthening its links with 
Arab countries, OSW Analyses, 18 March 2015, http://
www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-03-18/
germany-strengthening-its-links-arab-countries
12 Steven Geyer, Debatte um einen strategischen Partner, 
Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 January 2016, http://www.fr-on-
line.de/politik/deutsche-aussenpolitik-debatte-um-ein-
en-strategischen-partner,1472596,33059078.html
13 Justyna Gotkowska, Niemcy i USA wycofują Patrioty 
z Turcji, OSW Analyses, 26 August 2015, http://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-08-26/niemcy-i-
-usa-wycofuja-patrioty-z-turcji
The ongoing destabilisation of the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood and its con-
sequences have forced Germany to 
strengthen its engagement. This will re-
sult in the region’s significance increasing 
in German foreign and security policy.
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The Bundeswehr’s operations in Syria and Iraq, 
even though their extent is limited, open up 
a new chapter in the foreign engagement of 
Germany’s armed forces. Germany’s intensified 
military presence in the Middle East will shift 
Germany’s focus from NATO’s eastern flank to 
its southern one. The Bundeswehr’s participa-
tion in operations in the Middle East is small 
when compared to that of France or the Unit-
ed Kingdom. However, this is still a novelty in 
German security policy. Over the past twenty 
years the Bundeswehr was deployed mainly in 
the Western Balkans and Afghanistan. In 2016 
the operation in Syria will be Germany’s larg-
est foreign mission in terms of the number of 
soldiers deployed (up to 1,200). Furthermore, it 
expands the range of possible Bundeswehr de-
ployments abroad to include military support 
for UN member states which are not in fact Ger-
many’s allies, such as Iraq. It is also important 
not to forget the arms and military equipment 
supplies and the presence of German military 
instructors in northern Iraq (up to 150 soldiers) 
– this mission broke the unwritten rule that 
Germany does not supply weapons to regions 
affected by a military conflict. The Bundeswehr 
may also continue its military engagement in 
Syria in future through participation in a pos-
sible UN stabilisation operation once the civil 
war there is over. With the aim of halting the 
destabilisation of the southern neighbourhood, 
Germany has also been expanding its military 
engagement in Africa. It is present in Mali 
(up to 650 soldiers in the UN’s MINUSMA stabi-
lisation mission and up to 350 German soldiers 
in the EU’s training mission EUTM Mali) and 
most probably in Libya/Tunisia (with 150 to 200 
Bundeswehr soldiers training the Libyan armed 
forces in Tunisia)14. 
14 Von der Leyen: Bundeswehr-Einsatz möglich, Deutsch-
landfunk, 18 January 2016, http://www.deutschland-
funk.de/libyen-von-der-leyen-bundeswehr-einsatz-mo-
eglich.447.de.html?drn:news_id=570717
APPENDIX 1
Actions taken by the international coalition against Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria 
In August 2014, the USA launched surveillance operations and air strikes on IS targets in Iraq, 
and in September 2014 it extended the operation to Syria, naming it ‘Operation Inherent 
Resolve’. In the next few months, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Jordan, 
Canada, Belgium and Denmark joined the US-led operation in Iraq (Belgium and Denmark withdrew 
their aircraft in autumn 2015 due to personnel shortages and technical and financial problems). 
The Arab states of the Persian Gulf– the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jor-
dan – took part in the first air raids on targets in Syria alongside US forces. However, the participa-
tion of these Arab countries in the operation in Syria was to a great extent symbolic, and – with the 
exception of Jordan – they no longer participate in the air strikes. Canada, Turkey, France, Australia 
and the United Kingdom joined the airstrikes on IS targets in Syria in 2015, with the Netherlands 
joining in February 2016. The US share in the operation over Iraq and Syria is incomparably larger 
than that of all other coalition members. Since 2014, the USA and other countries have also been 
engaged in training Kurdish and Iraqi forces in Iraq – in the Kurdistan Region (Finland, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden), in Anbar province 
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(Denmark) and in Baghdad province (the USA, Australia, Spain, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, 
Portugal, Belgium, France, Italy and Norway). The European countries’ training contingents consist 
of 100 to 200 soldiers. The USA (the CIA and the Pentagon) are also engaged in training Syrian op-
position units in Syria and Turkey. Additionally, US and British special forces units are conducting 
operations against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq. 
As regards the European allies, France was the first country to join the USA in bombing IS targets 
in Iraq in September 2014. French aircraft began reconnaissance and bombardment flights also over 
Syria in September 2015. After the Paris terrorist attacks, France’s contribution to the operation – 
a total of around 3,500 soldiers – includes a maritime and air contingent: the Charles de Gaulle 
aircraft carrier with an escort group of ships (including four French), 18 Rafale aircraft in the naval 
version, six Rafale aircraft in the land-based version, six Mirage aircraft in the 2000-D and 2000-N 
versions, eight SEM assault aircraft and two early warning E2C Hawkeye aircraft1. 
The United Kingdom has been engaged in air strikes in Iraq and reconnaissance operations over 
Iraq and Syria since autumn 2014. In December 2015, it also began bombing targets in Syria. 
The British contribution (around 850 soldiers) following enlargement in December 2015 includes: 
ten Tornado GR-4 aircraft, six Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft and ten MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial 
vehicles, one Voyager aircraft for aerial refuelling, two Sentinel surveillance aircraft, one RC-135W 
Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft, one AWACS surveillance aircraft, one 45 HMS Defender type 
destroyer (this was included in the team covering the French aircraft carrier), and one 23 type frigate. 
Smaller European allies: Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands have also taken part in the US-led 
international coalition. The participation of Belgium and Denmark has so far been limited to bomb-
ing targets in Iraq. The Netherlands have been taking part in the operation in Iraq since October 
2014, with a total of eight F-16 aircraft (250 soldiers) and decided to extend it over Syria in January 
2016. Denmark sent a total of seven F-16 aircraft (around 140 soldiers) between October 2014 and 
October 2015. Due to personnel shortages, Denmark replaced its withdrawn F-16 aircraft with the 
deployment (in Iraq) of a mobile radar for monitoring the air space of Iraq and Syria in January 2016; 
it has also promised to send F-16 aircraft again at some point in the future. Belgium took part in air 
strikes in Iraq between October 2014 and July 2015 with its six F-16 aircraft and transport aircraft 
(around 120 soldiers), but it withdrew from the operation due to financial difficulties.
1 See: Claire Mills, Ben Smith, Louisa Brooke-Hollande, ISIS/DAESH: the military response in Iraq and Syria, Briefing Paper 
No. 06995, House of Commons Library, 3 December 2015, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Sum-
mary/SN06995#fullreport
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Syria peace talks
The peace talks aimed at ending the civil war in Syria and attempts to resolve the conflict between 
the Bashar al-Assad regime and the various opposition groupings by political means have been un-
derway since 2011. The initiatives made so far (for example, by the Arab League, the Friends of Syria 
Group and special UN envoys Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi) have been unsuccessful partly due to 
disagreement between the main actors in the region (including Saudi Arabia and Iran) and the world 
powers engaged in the Middle East (the USA and Russia) over the end of the civil war and the future 
of Syria, including President Assad. 
The breakthrough took place after the deal on the Iranian nuclear programme was signed in July 
2015 (as part of P5+1 negotiations between the permanent members of the UN Security Council 
and Germany, the EU and Iran). Teheran was able to join the negotiations concerning the resolu-
tion of the Syrian conflict afterwards. The decisive meeting of seventeen countries, including Iran, 
took place in October 2015 in Vienna. The International Syria Support Group (ISSG) was established 
during the meeting - its members are: the Arab League, China, Egypt, the EU, France, Germany, 
Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emir-
ates, the United Kingdom, the UN and the USA. The ISSG in a declaration developed during its two 
meetings in Vienna (on 30 October and 14 November 2015) points to concrete steps that need 
to be taken to end the civil war in Syria, including announcing a ceasefire, launching peace talks 
that will lead to the formation of a new government and an election being held within eighteen 
months of the declaration passing. These suggestions were repeated and supplemented in UN Se-
curity Council Resolution 2254 of 18 December 20151, which is expected to serve as a road map for 
the resolution of the conflict by political means2. In this document, the Security Council clarifies that 
(1) the negotiations between the Syrian government and representatives of the opposition are ex-
pected to begin under the aegis of the United Nations in January 2016, (2) it recognises the ISSG as 
the central platform for helping the UN in its efforts to bring about a compromise concerning Syria; 
(3) a new inclusive and secular government should be formed in Syria within the next 6 months, and 
a new constitution should be passed and a free election under UN supervision should be held within 
another 18 months; (4) a ceasefire should be announced from the moment when the negotiations 
begin between the Syrian government and the opposition.
1 The UN Security Council’s attempts to pass the resolution in 2012 were blocked by Russia and China
2 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2254 (2015), 18 December 2015, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.
asp?symbol=S/RES/2254%20%282015%29
APPENDIX 2
